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 THE SOLO NUMERO PARADOX
 Istvan Aranyosi
 L/eibniz notoriously insisted that no two
 individuals differ solo numero, that is, by be
 ing primitively distinct, without differing in
 some property The details of Leibniz's own
 way of understanding and defending the prin
 ciple—known as the principle of identity of
 indiscernibles (henceforth "the Principle")—is
 a matter of much debate. However, in contem
 porary metaphysics an equally notorious and
 discussed issue relates to a case put forward
 by Black (1952) as a counterexample to
 any necessary and nontrivial version of the
 principle. Black asks us to imagine, via one
 of the fictional characters of his dialogue, a
 world consisting solely of two completely
 resembling spheres, in a relational space. The
 supporter of the principle is then forced to
 admit that although there are ex hypothesi two
 objects in that universe, there is no property
 (except trivial ones), not even relational ones,
 to distinguish them, and hence the necessary
 version of the principle is falsified.
 In this essay, I will argue that Black's
 possible world, together with the dialectic
 between the potential friends and foes of the
 Principle as expounded by Black himself and
 other authors, leads to paradox, which I will
 call "the solo numero paradox." That is not to
 say, however, that Black's world is itself not
 possible per se, but that, apparently, describ
 ing that world can never coherently settle the
 debate. I will offer a solution to the paradox,
 based on a new version of the principle which,
 I will argue, is the weakest nontrivial version
 offered so far and should be acceptable by
 both sides of the debate as close enough to
 the standard one. Black's world will be shown
 to verify this new principle.
 i. Triviality and Impurity
 The Principle, stated in the most general
 form, that Black takes as his target can be
 formally expressed as follows:
 (PII,) □[V*VyVP (Px ee Pj,) 3 x=y]
 That is: necessarily, for any individuals x and
 y, and any property P, if x has P if, and only if
 y has P, then x and y are identical. Or, more
 informally, if individuals x and y have exactly
 the same properties, then they are identical.
 A counterexample to (PII,) is then of the fol
 lowing general form:
 (C-PII,) 0[3x3vVP (Px = Py) & x£y]
 Black's two-sphere world is intended to verify
 (C-PII,), so to defend the principle is to deny
 either the indiscernibility (the first conjunct in
 the above formula), or the distinctness of Jt and
 y. Denying the second has not been without
 proponents (e.g., Hacking 1975), but it is part
 of the present hypothesis that there really are
 two spheres in that world. Hence, the supporter
 of the principle is challenged to come up with
 a distinguishing property, i.e., a property such
 that it is not true that both x and y have it.
 ©2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
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 The first option considered by Black, and
 discussed extensively in Odegard (1964), is
 a so-called "identity-property,"1 like being
 identical to a, where "a" is a name referring
 to one of the spheres. It is agreed by virtually
 everyone in the debate that such properties, to
 the extent that they can be considered proper
 ties to begin with, trivialize the principle. Of
 course, being identical to a will be a property
 that is not instantiated by b, under the as
 sumption that there are two spheres and that
 "b" is a name for the sphere that is distinct
 from a. The problem is, as pointed out by
 several authors (Black 1952, Odegard 1964,
 Adams 1979, Katz 1983, Rodriguez-Pereyra
 2006), that allowing quantification over such
 properties in (PII,) makes it trivial: to say that
 only a has the property of being identical to
 a is no different in meaning from saying that
 a and b are distinct, which was supposed
 to follow from some claims regarding the
 properties instantiated by the two spheres, not
 to be assumed at the outset. So an argument
 for the principle based on considering such
 properties is question-begging and, further
 more, proves nothing but a trivial version of
 it. Consequently, the quantifier binding the
 predicate variable in (PIIj) has to be restricted
 to some subset of properties, namely those
 that do not trivialize the principle.
 A more inclusive category of properties that
 Black considers is that of impure properties.
 These are properties that essentially involve
 the existence of particular objects. Some of
 them are extrinsic relational, e.g., being mar
 ried to John Hawthorne, living close to the
 Eiffel Tower. Others are intrinsic relational,
 e.g., having Jay Leno's lower jaw as a proper
 part. One question is whether such properties
 trivialize the principle. Some argue that they
 do (Ayer 1959, pp. 26-35; Forrest 2006), some
 that they do not (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006).
 We should first notice that impure proper
 ties, in general, do not involve the danger of
 trivializing the principle. Consider an asym
 metric world, where there are two intrinsi
 cally indiscernible spheres with a distance of
 5 meters between them, and a cube, called c,
 which is at 2 meters distance from one and 3
 meters from the other. The property of being
 2 meters from c is an impure property had by
 one of the spheres. Yet the fact that one can
 ascribe this property to one variable without
 ascribing it to another variable shows that one
 can safely move to the existential instantiation
 of these variables by names, without any trivial
 assumption to the effect that there are two non
 coreferring names.2
 However, in the particular case of Black's
 universe, any impure property has no chance
 but to involve either one or the other of the
 two spheres, hence, the problem in that
 universe seems to be that one can never le
 gitimately appeal to existential instantiation.
 Existential instantiation is a valid inference
 rule only when the names that are used as
 instantiating the quantified formula are intro
 duced precisely for the purpose of standing
 for the particular thing, whatever it may be,
 that makes the premise in quantified form
 true. However, for Black's universe, such a
 strategy is not available. In that universe the
 following formula is presented as true, and
 consequently, as a challenge to the supporter
 of the principle:
 (1) 3x3yVP (Px = P;y) & xjty
 Since the second conjunct is unavailable for
 existential instantiation for the supporter of
 the principle, because it is supposed to be
 explained in terms of some facts about the
 first conjunct according to the principle, she
 has to somehow extract a property from the
 conceived situation that would distinguish two
 objects, a and b, e.g., by being ascribable to a
 and not to b. But the problem is that the very
 meaning of the quantified formula BxByVP (Px
 = Py) is such that the supporter of the principle
 cannot even begin using two names, "a" and
 "b" in a legitimate way; given the first con
 junct of premise (1), the only legitimate way
 to apply existential instantiation to it is:
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 (2) VP (Pa = Pa)3
 and not:
 (3) VP (Pa = Pbf
 Black himself (1952, pp. 156-157) appeals
 to such considerations, but it is even better
 expressed by Odegard (1964, p. 205):
 But, using "A" and "B" to refer to the given
 particulars is in effect an attempt to use differ
 ent names to refer to each of them—a move
 which is ex hypothesi impossible because it
 contradicts the indiscernibility condition of
 the hypothetical case. For, the successful use
 of different names in this case presupposes the
 possibility of qualitatively distinguishing the
 given particulars, i.e., the possibility of saying
 truly "A is the particular which..." and "B is the
 particular which " And, ex hypothesi, there
 are no possible grounds for so distinguishing
 them. The exponent of the Principle must here
 prove the discernibility of the given particulars,
 not assume it; and the use of different names to
 refer to each of them simply assumes it.... If,
 on the other hand, "A" and "B" are not being
 used as different names in this context, then they
 must have something of the force of variables,
 (p. 205; emphases in original)
 So the supporter of the principle is left with
 the choice of either using the names ille
 gitimately, and hence beg the question, or to
 use them as disguised variables. The second
 option is bad news for her because now she
 cannot appeal to impure properties, e.g., be
 ing at a nonzero distance from b, which would
 distinguish the two spheres (since a is not at
 a nonzero distance from a), but can use only
 the pure versions entailed by the former, e.g.,
 being at a nonzero distance from something.
 The pure versions cannot distinguish the
 spheres because it is true of both that: "at a
 nonzero distance from something and at no
 nonzero distance from itself."
 2. Paradox
 I agree that this is all bad news for the
 supporter of the Principle, who appears en
 snared by her own theoretical commitments.
 However, if one focuses one's attention on the
 resources the opponent of the Principle might
 deploy in accounting for Black's universe,
 paradox ensues. Informally, the paradox is the
 following. The opponent of the Principle, as
 opposed to its supporter, is free and entitled
 to assume that the two objects are primitively
 distinct, that is, differ solo numero. So "a is
 distinct from b" seems to be an unproblematic
 assertion on his part, as he can, and must by
 postulation, assume primitive distinctness.
 But that assertion being primitively true just
 means (i.e., biconditionally implies) that the
 above mentioned impure properties, e.g., be
 ing at 5 meters distance from b, are instanti
 ated and will distinguish the two spheres. To
 be more precise, consider the relation, D, "is
 at a nonzero distance from." Even though
 this relation holds symmetrically between a
 and b, still the impure versions of the unary
relational properties that follow from D will
 be distinct properties, i.e., being at a non
 zero distance from a and being at a nonzero
 distance from b. This is so because for the
 opponent of the Principle (as opposed to the
 supporter of it) the names "a" and "b" are not
 disguised variables. So even if both individu
 als have the property of not being at a nonzero
 distance from itself\ still the relational proper
 ties involving nonzero distance from the other
 given object (i.e., being at a nonzero distance
 from a and being at a nonzero distance from
 b) are not instantiated by both. Hence, they
 are discernible. But if they are discernible,
 then they are not solo numero different.
 Now, for the formal version we will use
 some rules and notation of lambda calculus. A
 lambda abstract will have as its general form
 "(Av)(E)," where "v" stands for a variable,
 "A," stands for the lambda-operator, and "E"
 is called "the body of the abstraction." There
 are three rules that we will use, a-conversion
 and ^-conversion, and ^-abstraction. The first
 of these rules, a-conversion, allows changing
 the names of A,-bound variables, i.e., replac
 ing each of them with an arbitrary name.
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 (3-conversion is the operation of applying the
 function (i.e., the abstraction) to an argument;
 the result of such an operation is called an
 "application." The result of ^-abstraction is
 a lambda abstract and can be thought of as
 extracting from a formula a singular term
 standing for a property. To give some intui
 tive examples, (taO(Rjtz) is a-equivalent to
 (^yXRyz), and (An)(«+3)a is (3-equivalent
 to a+3. From a formula like, e.g., BxRxy, we
 can obtain by A,-abstraction (Ajc)(Rxy). Our
 first premise is that a and b are different solo
 numero:
 (4) VP (Pa e= Pb) & a * b
 The second premise is:
 (5) [VP (Pa = Pb)&a^b]z> -,[(Ajc)(Dfcc)
 (a)=a(\x)(Dax)(b)]
 What proposition (5) asserts is that a and b
 being different solo numero implies that the
 application to a of the property being at a
 nonzero distance from b is not a-equivalent
 to the application to b of the property being
 at a nonzero distance from a. The argument
 for (5) would be the following:
 Suppose a ^ b. Consider the two objects in
 Black's world being at a certain nonzero dis
 tance from each other. Then (Xx)(T)bx)(a) and
 (ta:)(Da*)(fr). Also: —i(taf)(Dfot)b, and —.(ta:)
 (Dajt)a. The latter two formulae can be ex
 pressed (via fj-conversion, then ^.-abstraction
 and a-conversion) as (A,z)(-iDzz)a and (\z)
 (—iDzz)b. That is, the property of not being at a
 nonzero distance from oneself is shared by both
 individuals. However, since the given objects
 are assumed as primitively distinct, the former
 two properties, involving the given particulars
 essentially, have to be distinct as well, namely,
 (.hc)(Dbx) and (hc)(Dax). This means that (Ajc)
 (Dbx){a) and Ckx)(Dax)(b) are not a-equivalent.
 From (5) and the second conjunct of (4) it
 follows that there is at least one property that
 is not shared by a and b, hence they are not
 solo numero different:
 (5) 3P —i(Pa = Pb) (4, 5)
 (6) -,VP (Pa = Pb) & a * b (6)
 (7) 1(5, 8)
 So if a and b are different solo numero, then
 they are not different solo numero.
 The opponent of the Principle might try
 to find a property abstract that would apply
 to both a and b, such that it would somehow
 contain the two property abstracts present
 in the consequent of (5), but would not be
 reducible to them. If there were, e.g., an
 irreducibly disjunctive property having as
 disjuncts Dbx and Dax, and shared by a and
 b, then the problematic impure properties (Ajc)
 (Dbx) and Ckx)(Dax) would not be applicable
 outside that disjunction to the given objects.
 The problem is that a property abstract like
 (Xx)(Dbx v Dax), although applicable to both
 objects, it is not irreducibly disjunctive, given
 that it is known that neither of the objects
 instantiates Dxx. In other words, (Ajt)(Dfoc v
 Dax)(a) is reducible to (kx){T>bx){a)\ mutatis
 mutandis for b. Hence, the implication in (5)
 holds just as before.
 Another strategy could be to find a so-called
 arbitrary object z (also called "indefinite ob
 ject" in the literature) such that, e.g., a has
 the property of being the z such that z has the
 property of be ng either at a nonzero distance
 from a or from b, that is: (Xz.)[(Xu)(Dbu v
 D u)(z)](a). And, of course, mutatis mutandis
 for b. Now, since z is an arbitrary object (e.g.,
 whatever is denoted by "a sphere," or "one of
 the spheres" in the two-sphere universe), the
 body of the ^-abstract binding z is irreducibly
 disjunctive. In other words, (Xu)(Dbu v Dau)
 (z) is not reducible to either Cku)(Dbu)(z) or
 (Xu)(Dau)(z). However, as pointed out in Fine
 (1983, p. 62), P-conversion fails in the case
 of disjunctions as applied to arbitrary objects.
 More precisely, the rule of disjunction is not
 applicable to arbitrary objects in any direct
 way. Consider an arbitrary natural number.
 The range of the arbitrary object is the set
 of natural numbers. Some are odd, some
 are even. So we can assert that the arbitrary
 object is odd or even. But an arbitrary natural
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 number is not even, and it is not odd. So the
 disjunction rule (i.e., that a disjunction is true
 iff some of its disjuncts is true) fails.5 Hence,
 as applied to our case: —i [(kz)[(ku){Y)bu v
 Dau)(z)](a) ^ (Xu)(Dbu v Dau)(a)].
 3. Instantial Terms, Arbitrary
 Objects, and Context-Dependent
 Quantifiers
 The above discussion seems to bring about
 a trilemma. The supporter of the Principle
 has to choose between taking "a" and "b"
 as having the force of variables or that of
 proper names designating particular objects.
 As made clear above, the first choice does
 not account for the distinctness of the two
 spheres in Black's world, whereas the sec
 ond was not available to her to begin with,
 because it presupposed that the objects had
 already been distinguished. Third, the oppo
 nent of the Principle can appeal to "a" and
 "b" as names of primitively distinct objects,
 but then he is forced into paradox, because
 now impure properties of the type being at
 a distance from a will be applicable to each
 object and will distinguish them, hence they
 will not be primitively distinct.
 The solution is based on denying that the
 choice between variables and proper names as
 interpretations for the terms "a" and "b" is a
 genuine dichotomy. There is a third category
 that these terms can be taken to be, namely,
 what King (1991) calls "instantial terms."
 These are terms that in mathematics are used
 to designate an arbitrary mathematical object
 (as in, "Take an arbitrary prime number n
 is the instantial term), and in the logic of natu
 ral deduction are free variables introduced
 by the rule of existential instantiation (as in
 "There are some red things (3xRr). Take one
 of them (Ry)...y is the instantial term) and
 eliminated by the rule of universal generaliza
 tion (as in "Take an arbitrary person [Px]. It
 is tall [Tjc]. Hence, all persons are tall [Vy Py
 3 Ty]"; x is the instantial term).
 However, it is not the syntax that is inter
 esting about such terms, but their semantics
 and the truth conditions associated with their
 use. Fine (1983,1985a, 1985b) offers a theory
 of arbitrary objects as the designata of such
 instantial terms, offering, among other things,
 individuation conditions for them, whereas
 King (1991) argues that they are disguised
 context dependent quantifiers (CDQ), where
 the context encodes all the relevant informa
 tion for the properties of the instantial term
 within a derivational structure. We need not
 enter all the details of these accounts, as
 for all our purposes they will both give the
 very same verdicts, but focus instead on two
 important aspects. First, we should point out
 that instantial terms have a generality that
 makes them unlike terms that refer to a defi
 nite object, like, e.g., proper names do. But
 unlike variables, they are never supposed to
 be bound by quantifiers. And, second, and
 this is most emphasized by King, there are
 dependence relations between the semantic
 value of these terms and the derivational
 context in which they figure.
 The idea of context dependence is that the
 truth of a sentence with an occurrence of an
 instantial term is always evaluated in a deri
 vational context, i.e., in a formal argument,
 or in an argument using ordinary English. Let
 us use an example offered by King (1991).
 (Fl)
 premise (1) Every professor has a bad student.
 premise (2) Every bad student hates each of
 his/her professors.
 (3) Consider an arbitrary professor.
 (4) By (1), the professor has a bad
 student.
 (5) Consider the professor's bad
 student.
 (6) By (2), the student hates the
 professor.
 (7) So every professor is hated by
 some student, (p. 246)
 There are various dependence relations here.
 According to King's CDQ-account, both
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 types of the italicized terms, "the professor"
 and "the student," are context dependent
 quantifiers. Their force (existential or univer
 sal) depends on what propositions they were
 derived from and what other propositions
 have been assumed. For instance, the force
 of "the professor" in (4) is universal, as it
 is derived from (1) where the variable was
 bound by a universal quantifier. The force of
 "the professor's bad student" in (5) is exis
 tential, as the clause "Consider . .in (5) is
 dependent on an existential quantifier in (4),
 which in turn depends on the existential quan
 tifier applied to "student" in (1). Intuitively,
 having already considered an arbitrary profes
 sor from all the professors, we have thereby
 considered that the professor has some bad
 student. So considering that bad student is
 going to preserve the quantificational force
 of "some student."
 Similarly, their scopes relative to each
 other are derivationally context dependent.
 For instance, the scope of "the student" in
 (6) is wider relative to that of "the professor."
 Finally, the domains over which they range
 are also in a dependence relation, as the clause
 "Consider ..in (5) determines the domain
 associated with the subsequent occurrences
 of "the student."
 Fine (1983) provides a similar story, based
 on dependent and independent arbitrary
 objects, and offers individuation criteria. In
 dependent arbitrary objects are identical iff
 they have the same range. Dependent ones
 are identical iff they have the same range
 and depend on the same arbitrary objects in
 the same way. A useful analogy here is with
 independent versus mutually exclusive events
 in statistics. For instance, the lottery involves a
 number of random draws of natural numbers
 from a finite set, such that after the first number
 is selected, all subsequent draws depend on the
 previous choice in the sense that the previous
 numbers are not in the set any more. If after
 each draw the number were put back in the
 pool, the draws would be independent. Things
 are similar with instantial terms if they stand
 for arbitrary objects. There are derivational
 contexts in which two or more instantial terms
 are independent, and there are such contexts
 in which the reference of some depends on
 what choices of arbitrary objects have already
 occurred within the derivation. The above
 derivational structure, (Fl), can be analyzed
 in terms of dependent arbitrary objects, just
 as in terms of CDQs. The difference between
 King's and Fine's approach is that the former
 stresses derivational context dependence as an
 essential feature of instantial terms, whereas
 the latter mentions this as more like a "side
 effect" of his theory of arbitrary objects.
 4. Back to the Principle
 The above discussion is relevant to the
 debate about the Principle in the following
 way. Taking "a" and "b" as instantial terms
 when inquiring about whether the Principle
 has counterexamples or not has a number of
 positive consequences, for both the supporter
 and the opponent of it.
 Let us first consider the supporter. The
 evaluation of the Principle's truth value will
 involve instantial terms, and hence will es
 sentially involve a context—a derivational
 structure or any relevant discourse fragment
 within which the evaluation is undertaken.
 The context will determine for each occur
 rence of such terms their reference, consider
 ing them as referring to arbitrary objects, or
 their associated quantifier, under the CDQ
 approach. The novel feature of the Principle
 is now that we do not need to include impure
 properties, which essentially involve definite
 objects, in the domain of quantification asso
 ciated with the predicate variable in (PII,), as
 they are controversial as far as their potential
 threat to trivialize the Principle is concerned.
 Instead, the domain will include only pure
 properties, but some of these will be what
 we will call "instantial properties," i.e., the
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.237 on Fri, 06 Jul 2018 13:48:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE SOLO NUMERO PARADOX / 353
 derivational context-dependent properties
 that the variables get by being instantiated by
 the instantial terms, given a derivation. Given
 this, the new principle will explicitly mention
 derivational context:
 (PII2) □[VxV.yVPVC (Px in C=Py in C) 3 x=y]
 The new principle states that necessarily, if
 x and y are indiscernible in all derivational
 contexts, then they are identical, or that no
 two things can possibly be indiscernible in
 all derivational contexts. Indiscernibility in a
 derivational context will involve, of course,
 sameness of standard instrinsic and extrinsic
 (pure) properties, but it will also involve, as
 stated above, sameness of instantial proper
 ties—sameness of force, range, and relative
 scope for the relevant instantial terms intro
 duced or eliminated during the derivational
 processes involving quantified formulae.
 The novelty of the approach is to introduce,
 besides the standard (pure) properties that
 object might have, the (pure) properties these
 objects have qua objects of reasoning.
 The new principle seems true: if some ob
 jects are indistinguishable both in their pure
 properties and in our reasoning about them,
 then they are one and the same object. Black's
 universe, or any similarly symmetric universe
 (e.g., with three spheres arranged as an equi
 lateral triangle), are not counterexamples to
 (PII2), since there are derivational contexts
 in which the instantial terms have different
 relational properties relative to the context.
 For instance, in the following derivational
 context associated with the two-sphere world:
 (C,)
 (1) All spheres are at a distance from a sphere
 (Vx3y Sx z> Dxy & Sy). (hypothesis)
 (2) Consider an arbitrary sphere (Sz).
 (3) It is at a distance from a sphere
 (3y Dzy & Sy).
 (4) Consider the sphere that the arbitrary
 sphere is at a distance from (Su & Dzu).
 (5) Suppose it is made of iron (Iw).
 (6) ...
 Wherever the particular derivation may fur
 ther proceed, we can already extract informa
 tion to the effect that the arbitrary object that
 is the reference of "it" in (3) is different from
 that which is the reference of "it" in (5). Tak
 ing them as CDQs, the range of z is all the
 spheres, whereas the range of u is restricted
 by the "consider . . clause in (4), so that
 it includes everything except the arbitrary
 sphere z. Such instantial properties, therefore,
 make us able to distinguish the two spheres.
 It is important to note that any relation or
 relational property will do as predicated by
 an arbitrary object when it comes to distin
 guishing the objects via instantial properties,
 except the relation of identity, or a relational
 property involving identity. In that case, the
 substitutivity of identity will make it the
 case that one can, and has to, use the same
 instantial term when considering the arbitrary
 object that stands in the identity relation with
 some previously selected arbitrary object.
 So, for instance, if in the above derivational
 context we replace being at a distance from
 something with being identical to something,
 then we get:
 (C2)
 (1) All spheres are identical to a sphere
 (Vx3v Sx z> x = y & Sy). (hypothesis)
 (2) Consider an arbitrary sphere (Sz).
 (3) It is identical to a sphere (By z = y & Sy).
 (4) Consider the sphere that the arbitrary
 sphere is identical to (Sz).
 (5) Suppose it is made of iron (Iz).
 (6) ...
 Clause (4) must be taken as a duplicate of
 clause (2), as the predicate "is identical to"
 makes the substitution "z" for in (3) legiti
 mate, given the substitutivity of identity. On
 the other hand, the relation of being distinct
 from stated in the hypothesis would make the
 distinctness between the two arbitrary objects
 trivial, as it is already assumed in the hypoth
 esis, as a clause like "Consider the sphere that
 is distinct from the arbitrary sphere" would by
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 itself, analytically, entail that a new instantial
 term has to be introduced, rather than merely
 as a function of the context containing pre
 vious such clauses. But excluding both the
 identity property and impure properties from
 such derivational context is a way to keep the
 Principle safe from trivialization.
 So, taking the names for the two spheres as
 instantial terms makes it possible in a nontriv
 ial way for the Principle not to be falsified by
 Black's world. Clauses of the type "Consider
 an arbitrary sphere" are constituents of many
 derivational contexts that can distinguish the
 two spheres. Black himself, at one point,
 considers such a clause, via his character^,
 but swiftly—too swiftly, indeed—rejects it;
 the passage is this:
 A. (...) Consider one of the spheres, a,...
 B. How can I, since there is no way of telling
 them apart? Which one do you want me to
 consider?
 A. This is very foolish. I mean either of the two
 spheres, leaving you to decide which one you
 wished to consider. If I were to say to you "Take
 any book off the shelf' it would be foolish on
 your part to reply "Which?"
 B. It's a poor analogy. I know how to take a book
 off a shelf, but I don't know how to identify one
 of two spheres supposed to be alone in space
 and so symmetrically placed with respect to
 each other that neither has any quality or char
 acter that the other does not also have. (Black
 1952, p. 156)
 The error here in B's reasoning is to assume
 that the name "a" in "Consider one of the
 spheres, a, . . ." must be taken as a constant
 designating a definite object, instead of, quite
 naturally, being taken as an instantial term
 designating an indefinite object, or a CDQ.
 B seems to be committed to the view that to
 consider an arbitrary sphere implies to con
 sider a definite sphere, i.e., in B's words, to
 "know how to identify one of two spheres,"
 by which he means to select a sphere that
 has been individuated beforehand. There is a
 simple and intuitive argument why this is not
 correct. When in mathematical proofs we are
 asked to consider a prime, all we are supposed
 to know is the definition of a prime number,
 i.e., the property that defines the class of
 primes. If knowledge of all definite primes
 were required, then we would either never
 be able to consider a prime, or considering
 a prime would mean considering a number
 that we know to be prime and can distinguish
 it from all other primes. Both of these op
 tions are absurd. It obviously makes sense to
 consider a prime, and the range of primes is
 much larger than the range of numbers that
 are known to be primes and are known to be
 distinguished from other primes. Considering
 a prime is compatible with the considered
 prime never having been thought about, as a
 definite number, by anyone, let alone known
 to be a prime.
 Further evidence that it is definite objects
 that character B assumes to be needed when
 being asked to consider a sphere in Black's
 world is apparent in the last lines of the part
 of the dialogue on this topic, when he uses the
 analogy of a mathematician who thinks that
 the Axiom of Choice ensures one the ability
 to choose a definite object (Black 1952):
 A. All I am asking you to do is to think of one
 of your spheres, no matter which, so that I may
 go on to say something about when you give
 me a chance.
 B. You talk as if naming an object and then
 thinking about it were the easiest thing in the
 world. But it isn't so easy. Suppose I tell you
 to name any spider in my garden: if you can
 catch one first or describe one uniquely you can
 name it easily enough. But you can't pick one
 out, let alone "name" it, by just thinking. You
 remind me of the mathematicians who thought
 that talking about an Axiom of Choice would
 really allow them to choose a single member
 of a collection when they had no criterion of
 choice, (p. 157)
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.237 on Fri, 06 Jul 2018 13:48:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE SOLO NUMERO PARADOX / 355
 Again, it is clear from this passage that char
 acter B is thinking in terms of proper names
 designating definite objects when asked to
 consider an arbitrary object. But this is not
 what is required: all one needs is what has
 been called instantial terms, or temporary con
 stants (Suppes 1999, p. 81), or dummy names
 (Lemmon 1961, p. 253), which stand for either
 an arbitrary object or, if that theory is not ac
 ceptable, for a CDQ or some similar item.
 What is important about these names is that
 they are used temporarily in truth-preserving
 derivational structures for the very purpose of
 ensuring truth-preservation. Further, if what
 we have pointed out in this section is right, then
 they do also play a role in nontrivially discern
 ing, by their feature of context-dependence, the
 relevant objects that they designate.
 The appeal to instantial terms and, conse
 quently, the introduction of instantial proper
 ties as properties of objects in their role in
 reasoning, might seem somewhat ad hoc. It
 is true that since Max Black's challenge the
 discussion has been run in terms of how to
 translate an ontological fact, like that of there
 being two distinct and perfectly alike spheres
 in a symmetric universe, into a logical lan
 guage where this fact would be expressed
 without appeal to the relations of identity
 and nonidentity, but Leibniz's principle is
 not obviously about how we reason about
 objects, but rather about what objects are.
 Hector-Neri Castaneda (1975), for instance,
 makes a distinction between the ontological
 problem of individuation, which according
 to him has to do with the internal constitu
 tion of individuals, and the epistemological
 problem of individuation, which inquires
 into the ways in which reasoners are able to
 single out individuals and distinguish them
 from other individuals. Castaneda's point
 is that these two aspects of the problem of
 individuation have been many times run
 together as if they were the same, and that
 they deserve separate discussion.
 In response, I would point out that the ap
 proach in this essay is neither that of confus
 ing the two problems, nor that of considering
 them as completely separate issues. Rather,
 the idea is to combine the two into a coher
 ent picture. Second, it is not claimed that
 one should exclusively focus on properties
 that objects have in their role in reasoning,
 but rather that such properties should be al
 lowed in one's repertoire when it comes to
 analyzing the relationships among objects in
 a domain of discourse, especially when which
 objects have what name is the very issue to
 be addressed. The idea is well exemplified
 by the dynamic approach to semantics in, for
 instance, Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman
 (1996). Dynamic semantics has been put
 forward as an alternative to standard truth
 conditional semantics in order to account
 for a notion of meaning, present in natural
 language discourse, that depends on the
 dynamics of discourse (dialogue, reasoning,
 storytelling, etc.), that is, on how informa
 tional states at each moment of an ongoing
 discursive process are being updated and with
 what semantic consequences. The meaning
 of a sentence in this setting is not its truth
 conditions but the change in informational
 states that an assertion of that sentence can
 potentially bring about. Variables are taken as
 anaphors, while quantifiers can bind variables
 beyond their syntactic scope. What is relevant
 from the point of view of the present essay
 is that in dynamic semantics there are two
 equally important types of information: infor
 mation about the world and information about
 the discourse. Although information about the
 discourse—for instance, about what has been
 said before in a derivation—appears in some
 sense as less "real," it is no less important than
 genuine information about the world when
 it comes to accounting correctly for several
 relations among objects in the world:
 Discourse information of this type looks more
 like a book-keeping device, than like real infor
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 mation. Yet, it is a kind of information which
 is essential for the interpretation of discourse,
 and since the latter is an important source of
 information about the world, discourse informa
 tion indirectly also provides information about
 the world. (Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman
 1996, p. 183)6
 5. Back to the Paradox
 How is the opponent of the original Prin
 ciple, (PII,), to make use of this theory?
 One thing to note is that she need not be an
 opponent of the new Principle, (PII2), as the
 thought behind the Black-type universe as
 a case of difference solo numero assumes
 that, since the distinctness fact involving the
 spheres (i.e., the one we get by instantiating
 x&y) involves them as definite objects, the
 indiscernibility fact involving them (i.e., the
 one we get by instantiating 3x3vVP Px = Pv)
 must also involve them as definite objects,
 whereas (PII2) involves arbitrary objects or
 CDQs in its antecedent (and definite ob
 jects as the ones we get by instantiating its
 consequent). More important, the paradox
 we described as marring the very attempt to
 formulate the solo numero doctrine can now
 be avoided, because (PII2) is compatible with
 the compossibility of multiple definite objects
 and only one arbitrary object or one CDQ,
 having the definite objects in its range. Such
 a compossibility is equivalent to there being
 distinct, independent possible derivational
 contexts, C3 and C4, such that considering an
 arbitrary sphere in C, and one in C2 picks out
 the same arbitrary object, but might pick out
 distinct definite objects.
 To see that this is so, note that the arbitrary
 objects or CDQs considered in such distinct
 derivational contexts will function as inde
 pendent from each other. Since for indepen
 dent arbitrary objects or CDQs the identity
 criterion is the sameness of their range, if the
 two derivational contexts are duplicates, the
 arbitrary object picked out in each context
 will be the very same, because duplicate deri
 vational contexts will have the same domain
 of quantification and the same range for their
 potential instantial terms. At the same time,
 of course, the range of this arbitrary object
 or CDQ can contain any number of definite
 objects. To exemplify, consider the following
 two duplicate derivational contexts involving
 Black's universe:
 c3
 1. There are two spheres made of iron.
 (3x3}' Sx & Sy & Lt & Iy & x&y)
 2. Consider one of them. (Sz)
 3. It is made of iron. (Iz)
 4. ...
 c4
 1. There are two spheres made of iron.
 (3x3y Sx & Sy & Ix & 1} & xty)
 2. Consider one of them. (Sw)
 3. It is made of iron. (Iw)
 4. ...
 Here, although they are bearing differ
 ent names, i.e., "z" and "w," the arbitrary
 objects picked out by the "Consider . .
 clause in the two derivational contexts are
 identical, because they are independent of
 each other. But, of course, considering an
 arbitrary sphere in C3 and one in C4 does
 not tell us whether, if asked to think in terms
 of definite spheres, we have picked out the
 very same definite sphere or distinct such
 spheres. Still, the unique arbitrary sphere
 that is considered in both contexts has a
 range of two definite spheres, ex hypothesi.
 It is in this sense that the opponent of the
 PIIj was right in thinking that there can
 be objects that are different solo numero,
 namely, the case in which we do not keep
 the derivational context fixed as required
 by PII2. This means that PII9 is a principle
 that should equally be acceptable to both the
 opponent and the supporter of PII .
 The reason the solo numero paradox ensued
 was proposition (5), restated here:
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 (5) [VP (Pa = P b)&a*b]z> ^[(\x)(Dbx)
 (a) =a (hc)(Dax)(b)]
 This proposition does not mention any deriva
 tional context as required by PII2 for asserting
 the truth or otherwise of formulae containing
 "a" and "b." If we hold fixed such a context
 across the lines of comparison between a and
 b in terms of the property abstracts that are
 applied to them, then PII2 is verified by the
 new proposition (5*):
 (5*) [VPVC (Pa in C = Pb in Q & a * b] =>
 —i [(Xx)(£>bx)(a) =a (?u)(Dax)(&)]
 If, on the other hand, we allow for variation in
 context, then the solo numero doctrine finds
 its place in paradox-free manner:
 (SN) VP3C,3C2 (Pa in C, = Pb in C,) & a * b
 This proposition is paradox-free because it
 does not imply that the ^-involving property
 abstracts as applied to a are not a-equivalent
 to the a-involving property abstracts as ap
 plied to b. So (5**) is false:
 (5**) SN 3 -,[(te)(D&c)(a) =a (Xx)(Dax)(b)\
 (5**) is false because it is not the case that
 property abstracts of the form (ta;)(Dfot) and
 Ckx)(Dbx) apply to a and b, respectively,
 taken as definite objects, across derivational
 contexts. They could only apply within the
 same derivational context, but in that case,
 of course, given our background theory
 underlying PII2, the difference is not solo
 numero.
 To conclude, there is a way to understand
 the assertion that objects can be different
 solo numero that does not lead to para
 dox—it is that two or more definite objects
 can have the very same pure properties,
 including instantial ones, given that they
 are reasoned about in distinct derivational
 contexts. On the other hand, there can be no
 two definite objects that have the same pure
 properties, including instantial ones, if these
 objects are reasoned about within the same
 derivational context.
 6. A Final Note:
 Difference Solo Nomine!
 In a brief note, Nicholas Rescher (1955)
 comes close to the main idea behind the pres
 ent theory that underlies PII2 when he writes:
 As a starting point we accept the statement that
 "The principle of the identity of indiscernibles
 may be taken to mean that if two objects Oj
 and 02 are numerically different then they
 are qualitatively different, they differ in some
 mentionable respect.'" The word "mention
 able" deserves special scrutiny; it contains the
 version of the principle which it is the object
 of this paper to examine, for it establishes the
 role that discourse plays in the principle. From
 this viewpoint the principle of the identity of
 indiscernibles is not ontological (dealing with
 things that are or might be), nor, a fortiori,
 physical (dealing with the natural phenomena
 of the world about us). Rather, the contention
 which the principle makes, in this interpretation,
 is semantic, (p. 153)
 Unfortunately, Rescher does not come to rec
 ognize the role context can play in discerning
 objects and does not develop his idea beyond
 a general suggestion to the effect that the Prin
 ciple holds when the language is rich enough
 to contain uniquely referring expressions for
 each distinct object in its domain of reference:
 In this interpretation principle of the identity of
 indiscernibles asserts that any two objects in the
 intended domain of reference of language (i.e.,
 a language) which are in fact different can be
 distinguished in that language. (1955, p. 153;
 emphases in original)
 There are various problems with Rescher's
 proposal, which there is not enough space
 h re to discuss, but one that is apparent might
 be put as follows: Rescher's criterion for
 evaluating the truth-value of the Principle will
 depend in Black-type cases on purely meta
 linguistic considerations. It will not appeal to
 predicates like "is red" or "is made of iron,"
 etc., because these are assumed as being
 shared by both objects, if shared by any. So
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 the relevant predicates will be metalinguistic,
 of the kind: "is called 'a' in language L," or
 even "is the denotation of 'the sphere that is
 at a distance from the one that is called "a"
 in language U in language L."
 The problem with this approach is that
 now the idea of difference solo numero is
 replaced with the possibility of difference
 solo nomine, i.e., objects differing solely in
 name and not in properties. To see this point,
 consider two languages, L and L*, such that
 the only difference between them is that the
 references of names 'a' and iV are switched
 between them. Now it is hard to make sense
 of the idea that each language by itself can
 discern the two objects without assump
 tions about the referential relation between
 language and world. The two languages are
 per se indiscernible; there is no more sense
 in asserting that the objects are distinguished
 "in that language"—which one, we may
 ask? The only way to even begin to discern
 them is to check out the referential relations
 between their terms and the domain, but that
 is not allowed by Rescher's assumption that
 the Principle is "not ontological" but only
 "semantic" (actually, metalinguistic in the
 relevant cases, i.e., the cases of potential
 counterexamples).
 To round up the argument, our proposal
 does not have the problem of solo nomine
 difference. The new principle, PII2, is both
 semantic, in some sense, and ontological, in
 another. It is semantic in that it essentially
 involves referential dependence relations
 among temporary names, i.e., instantial
 terms, within a given derivational struc
 ture. But it is also ontological in that these
 context-determined roles for instantial terms
 are taken as bona fide properties, i.e., instan
 tial properties, of the objects in question.
 One can even go further and analyze these
 instantial properties in a context in terms
 of relations to the brain states of a reasoner
 when effecting the derivation that consti
 tutes the context. Further, as we have seen
 when discussing the way to solve the solo
 numero paradox, from the point of view of
 the properties of arbitrary objects or CDQs,
 there are no distinct but indiscernible deriva
 tional contexts; when assuming two distinct
 and duplicate such contexts, i.e., C3 and C4
 above, we were led to accept a unique as
 signment of arbitrary objects or CDQs across
 them, because identity of range in the case
 of independent arbitrary objects or CDQs
 entails their identity (although, of course,
 these arbitrary objects or CDQs might have
 multiple definite objects in their range). In
 sum, the question "which one is which?"
 does not arise in the case of C3 and C4, as it
 does in that of Rescher's languages Ll and Ly
 simply because the references and structural
 properties of the relevant instantial terms do
 not vary across such duplicate contexts.
 Bilkent University, Ankara
 NOTES
 Conversations with Tufan Kiymaz, Ezgi Ulusoy Aranyosi, Sun Demirli, and Hilmi Demir prompted
 me to think more about problems of individuation of particulars; I would like to thank them for these.
 I would also like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions, as well as to the Scientific
 and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) for continued support of my research. I
 dedicate this essay to the memory of Jozsef Aranyosi, my father.
 1. Bernard Katz (1983) proposes the notion of basic identity properties (BIPs) in an attempt to expli
 cate properties that trivialize PII,: Fis a BIP iff (1) it is possible that 3x(Fx) and (2) it is necessary that
 VxV}'(Fx & Fy ... x - y). Predicates expressing BIPs are called "BIP-predicates." According to Katz,
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 then, a predicate "P" expresses a trivializing property iff "P" contains a BIP-predicate essentially or
 "P" may be defined in terms of some predicate that does. The notion of an identity property used in this
 essay is to be understood intuitively as the property expressed by a predicate that essentially involves
 (a) the relation of identity and (b) at least one particular, definite object as its relatum. The two types
 of examples are: being identical to a and being distinct from a.
 2. The names will be synonymous with the expressions "the one that is two meters from c" and "the
 one that is 3 miles from c."
 3. To be sure, (2) is logically incompatible with the existential instantiation of xty, but that is cold
 comfort for the supporter of the principle, for two reasons: (a) because she is asked to derive the in
 stantiation of xty rather than assume it, and (b) if she cannot do that, the incompatibility would rather
 force her to deny xty, which is contrary to one of the suppositions of Black's postulated universe.
 4. Of course, (3) itself does not discern a and b, but it can potentially serve as a premise for purposes
 of a reductio having as conclusion that (3) cannot be true, i.e., that a and b are discernible after all.
 5. The only sense in which we have a disjunction here is indirect, namely, that we can apply the dis
 junction rule to each of the individuals that are in the range of the arbitrary object, viz. (hc)(Cpc v v|/x)
 (jc) =p V/ (£i v i|ti), where (1,... i,...,«) is the range of x.
 6. Thanks to an anonymous referee for the objection and the suggestion regarding dynamic semantics.
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